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2 
Abstract 25 
Background: Confidential reporting systems play a key role in capturing information about 26 
adverse surgical events. However, the value of these systems is limited if the reports that 27 
are generated are not subjected to systematic analysis. The aim of this study was to provide 28 
the first systematic analysis of data from a novel surgical confidential reporting system in 29 
order to delineate contributory factors in surgical incidents and document lessons that can 30 
be learned. 31 
Materials and Method: One-hundred and forty-five patient safety incidents submitted to the 32 
UK Confidential Reporting System for Surgery (CORESS) over a 10-year period were 33 
analysed using an adapted version of the empirically-grounded Yorkshire Contributory 34 
Factors Framework (YCFF).  35 
Results: The most common factors identified as contributing to reported surgical incidents 36 
were cognitive limitations (30.09%), communication failures (16.11%) and a lack of 37 
adherence to established policies and procedures (8.81%). The analysis also revealed that 38 
adverse events were only rarely related to an isolated, single factor (20.71%) – with the 39 
majority of cases involving multiple contributory factors (79.29% of all cases had > 1 40 
contributory factor). Examination of active failures – those closest in time and space to the 41 
adverse event – pointed to frequent coupling with latent, systems-related contributory 42 
factors. 43 
Conclusions: Specific patterns of errors often underlie surgical adverse events and may 44 
therefore be amenable to targeted intervention, including particular forms of training. The 45 
findings in this paper confirm the view that surgical errors tend to be multi-factorial in nature, 46 
which also necessitates a multi-disciplinary and system-wide approach to bringing about 47 
improvements. 48 
Keywords: Safety Incidents, Adverse events, Contributory Factors, Cognitive Factors, 49 
Latent Contributors 50 
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Introduction 51 
The Institute of Medicine’s seminal report, “To Err is Human” (1), helped to fuel intense 52 
debate and research on the nature, frequency and magnitude of surgical error (2,3). The 53 
focus on surgery has been particularly considerable given the self-evident link between 54 
errors in the operating theatre and patient safety (4).  55 
To improve quality and safety, the surgical field, borrowing concepts from other high-56 
risk industries (5), has heavily promoted the use of incident reporting systems. Yet, such 57 
systems have been criticised as only providing a superficial impression of safety 58 
improvement (6–8). Notably, in contrast, the aviation industry regularly changes policy and 59 
practice on the basis of this information (9-11).  60 
Within individual hospitals, the quality and quantity of feedback is highly variable 61 
(8,9) and often generic, thus limiting specialty specific learning. In response, the Confidential 62 
Reporting System for Surgery (CORESS) was established (10). Modelled on aviation 63 
systems, CORESS was seen as an innovative development to produce a specialty-specific 64 
error reporting and learning system with, uniquely, a one-to-one mapping between incident 65 
report and feedback.  66 
The past two decades of healthcare research have seen the development of a 67 
number of theoretically grounded frameworks that provide a structured approach to incident 68 
analysis (11–14). The recently validated, evidence-based framework, the Yorkshire 69 
Contributory Factors Framework (YCFF) (15), recognises the broad spectrum of possible 70 
causes of hospital based patient safety incidents. Central to the YCFF is a system-based 71 
approach to understanding errors, where adverse events are viewed as a consequence of 72 
gaps at multiple levels of a system (16) – the product of a cumulative effect that can include 73 
active and latent failures. 74 
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The aim of this study was to establish the factors most commonly contributing to 75 
surgical incidents by applying the YCFF to CORESS reports.  76 
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Methods 77 
All complete and anonymised safety incidents reports published by the CORESS advisory 78 
committee (coress.org.uk) over a ten-year period (reports between February 2005 and 79 
August 2015) in January 2016 were extracted. This total of 145 included reports describing 80 
diagnostic or operative errors, technical failures, regulatory or procedural limitations or 81 
unsafe practices/protocols. The reports included reporter and feedback comments made by 82 
the CORESS Advisory Committee. The latter were removed before being shown to the 83 
coders to avoid the classification process being biased by the committee’s 84 
recommendations. Permission was obtained from the advisory commiteee to examine these 85 
anonymised, publically available data.  86 
The Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework 87 
Inherent within the YCFF is the recognition that adverse incidents can arise from errors at 88 
the sharp end (e.g. healthcare professional forgetting a key step of a protocol), but also have 89 
more distal causes (latent organisational deficiencies that could have been brewing in the 90 
system for years). The framework specifically identifies 19 factors, hierarchically ordered and 91 
arranged in order of proximity (in time and space) to the adverse event across 5 classes, 92 
described in Table 1.  93 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 94 
 95 
To ensure that key contributory factors were identified without inferring beyond the 96 
information provided in the report, each patient safety incident was analysed by two non-97 
surgeon reviewers - one a neuropsychologist and the other an expert in human factors. The 98 
primary raters were each paired with a senior surgeon, who were consulted on cases that 99 
were considered to require technical knowledge of specific medical procedures (n = 31). 100 
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To enhance inter-rater reliability, 20 cases were first analysed by both reviewers 101 
independently. Agreement at this stage was moderate (Cohen's kappa: .49), therefore a 102 
detailed checklist, with input from surgeons, FCTS and DW and human factors expert (RL), 103 
was produced, with examples within each of the 19 domains that were relevant in the 104 
context of surgical incidents. Further modification of the checklist was undertaken and after 105 
two iterations on 10 randomly selected reports from a sample of 20, a high level of inter-rater 106 
reliability (α ≥ .80) was achieved between the two primary raters on this subset of the data. 107 
The remaining 125 reports were randomly allocated to the two primary raters and 108 
independently assessed.  109 
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Results 110 
The frequency of the identified contributory factors for the raters was logged (total of 329 111 
factors from the 145 reports; Figure 1). Cognitive limitations (n = 99; 30.09%), 112 
communication systems issues (n = 53; 16.11%) and policy and procedure (n = 29; 8.81%) 113 
factors were the most frequently identified in these incident reports.  To provide a more 114 
coherent picture of these 19 factors, these data were organised based on the hierarchical 115 
classification proposed by the YCFF (Figure 1 inset), ordering by proximity of the factor to 116 
the incident, in time and space.  117 
Situational factors, particularly those associated with task characteristics (specifically, 118 
the novelty and difficulty of performing the surgery) were logged in 15.5% (n = 51) of 119 
incidents. Local working conditions issues were classified in 18.54% (n = 61) of the event,  120 
with issues related to clarity around roles and responsibilities and low staff to patient ratios. 121 
Factors furthest from the error in time and space - latent organizational (n = 42), and 122 
external factors (n = 11), were identified in 16.11% of incidents.  Often the contribution of 123 
these reflected issues around surgical technologies (i.e. design, adequacy and availability) 124 
and issues around policies and protocols (specifically, lack thereof) hindering performance.  125 
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 126 
Figure 1: Safety incidents classified by factor based on the Yorkshire Contributory Factors 127 
Framework (YCFF). The inset displays a summary of the rate of the 329 classifications by a 128 
hierarchical classification separating the factors by their proximity in time and space to the 129 
adverse event – ranging from active failures (most proximal) to latent external factors (least 130 
proximal).  131 
 132 
The data were further analysed to identify co-occurrence rates. Single factor 133 
incidents (i.e. only one contributory factor for an incident) accounted for 20.71% of the total 134 
number of reports. The data also revealed that the majority of incidents included two 135 
(42.14%) or three (24.2%) contributors (Figure 2A). The aim was to unpack this further by 136 
examining co-occurrence rates for each contributor. However, within the current dataset, it 137 
was only feasible to probe incident reports with our most frequent type of contributor – active 138 
failure (Figure 2B). Here, only 17% of reports showed that this factor was a sole contributor. 139 
Active failures were most often accompanied by situational factors (37.37% of cases), local 140 
0 25 50 75 100
Could Not Code
 External Policy Context
Design of Equipment & Supplies
Training & Education
   Support from Central Functions
Scheduling & Bed Management
Policy & Procedures
Physical Environment
   Staff Workload
Management of Staff & Staffing Levels
Supervision & Leadership
Lines of Responsibility
Equipment & Supplies
Task Characteristics
Patient
Individual
MDT
Safety Culture
Communication Systems
Cognitive Limitations
Frequency
Total Classifications = 329
Active Failure
Comminication/Safety Culture Factors
Situational Factors
Local Working Conditions
Latent Organisational Factors
Latent External Factors
Running Head: CORESS ANALYSIS 
 
9 
working conditions (35.35%), latent external factors (25.25%) and communication and safety 141 
culture related contributors (37.37%).  142 
 143 
 144 
Figure 2: (A) Examination of the rate of co-occurrence of factors show that two and three 145 
contributors per incident were most prevalent; (B) From the subset of 99 cases classified as 146 
active failures- we found that these issues were often likely to co-occur with other 147 
contributors.  These data show the frequency rates of each additional factor for these 148 
incidents. 149 
 150 
 151 
152 
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Discussion 153 
The most common factors identified as contributing to reported surgical incidents were 154 
cognitive limitations, communication failures and a lack of adherence to established policies 155 
and procedures. Adverse events were only rarely related to an isolated, single factor, with 156 
the majority of cases involving multiple contributory factors. 157 
The primary findings i.e. a high frequency of cognitive limitations, are consistent with 158 
and complement other recent attempts to systematically analyse error in healthcare. For 159 
example, Flin et al (17) found that the most frequent types of errors anesthetists experienced 160 
in complications for airway management related to situational awareness or cognitive 161 
processes preceding an action error. They most often found failures in attention, 162 
concentration, problem solving, decision-making and memory – which share substantial 163 
overlap with the cognitive limitations factor in the present study. Another recent human-164 
factors based framework revealed task failure (comprising skill, rule and knowledge based 165 
analysis) featured in 157 out of 498 incidents (18).  166 
The second most frequent factor related to communication system-related issues 167 
which also dovetails with previous work e.g. (19,20). In an analysis of malpractice claims - 168 
where the surgical errors led to patient injury, technical competence and communication 169 
breakdowns were the most frequently identified issues (21). A detailed analysis of 30 170 
adverse surgical events using a systems theory based approach as an alternative to root 171 
cause analysis (22), highlighted the importance of communication systems – where 172 
unsatisfactory systems lead to inconsistent processes, causing delays and 173 
misunderstandings in the delivery of care. Whilst the current analysis could not tease apart 174 
the types of communication failure contributing to incidents, previous work has shown that 175 
the majority of communication breakdowns happen at one-to-one level between transmitter 176 
and receiver, often through status asymmetries, uncertainty over job responsibilities and 177 
during hand-overs (23).  178 
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It is important to stress that whilst cognitive factors were particularly frequent, they 179 
may be the end-point product of other factors increasing the probability of their occurrence. 180 
Some of the limitations of the present study can be separated into issues around quantity 181 
and quality of the reports. The CORESS has been active for over a decade, but yielded only 182 
a small number of reports. A recent survey of members of the Association of Surgeons of 183 
Great Britain and Ireland (ASGBI; across specialties) found that 47% of respondents 184 
reported a significant error in their own performance and 75% were aware of a colleague 185 
experiencing error (24). Yet, 12% of surgeons were unaware of the procedure for reporting 186 
an error and 59% felt more guidance is needed. Most surprisingly, 40% indicated that a 187 
confidential reporting system (such as the one created by the ASGBI a decade earlier) 188 
would increase the likelihood of them reporting an error. It appears that more work is 189 
required to engage the surgical community to increase reporting practices. One approach 190 
may be to incorporate error logging into annual appraisals. This might also address issues 191 
around the selective nature of submissions – which provide only a small window into the 192 
nature of adverse surgical events.  193 
Alongside quantity, improving the quality of incident reports is also imperative. One 194 
recommendation is that the CORESS could change the layout and logging procedure (e.g. 195 
with prompts based on the factors we have identified) to allow one to reflect more on the 196 
incident. Such a step would be useful in discriminating between different types of cognitive 197 
limitations (25). Future research needs to evaluate the existing reporting method in light of 198 
our results and consider ways in which the reporting form could be optimised to improve 199 
data quality by aligning the information gathered with existing analysis tools (26).    200 
Whilst the checklist created for framework analysis was designed to be objective, the 201 
fact that the two primary raters in this study were specialists in psychology and human 202 
factors may have introduced a form of implicit bias. It is also worth considering alternative, 203 
complementary methods that could facilitate our understanding of adverse events in surgery 204 
through high quality data. For example, some have suggested the adoption of a mandatory 205 
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live recording of a procedure (27). The presence of a video after an adverse event would 206 
provide an information rich resource for identifying, reflecting and learning about errors 207 
(28,29) and could also be useful as an education tool for operating staff to improve 208 
intraoperative performance (30).  209 
Whilst this analysis does not speak to preventability (indeed, retrospective 210 
interpretations of preventability may be in the eye of the beholder (31)), it is worth 211 
considering interventions that could act as remedial strategies to target these errors. Issues 212 
around equipment and supplies appear to be readily amenable to intervention. The 213 
development of smart graspers that provide haptic feedback to guide the surgeon provides 214 
an illustration of how surgical technologies can reduce errors relating to the trauma caused 215 
by forceful instrument grasping (32). Cognitive errors of misidentifying an appendix as a 216 
fallopian tube could be amenable to perceptual identification training that included morphed 217 
versions of each structure. Similarly, communication skills training may address some of the 218 
issues in surgery that were highlighted in this study (33). 219 
Given the increasing complexity and prevalence of endoscopic and robotic 220 
procedures, incidents linked to task characteristics and technical competence may increase 221 
over time. The opportunities offered by simulation training for surgical skill acquisition have 222 
been well documented (34–40), but the field has yet to fully exploit these methods (which 223 
may, in part, be due to system and resource related constraints). Interventions that directly 224 
target cognitive and motor preparation are showing promise. The benefits of “warming up” 225 
for optimal surgical performance are becoming clearer (41–43), with emerging evidence 226 
indicating that the risk of intra-operative errors related in perceptual identification and spatial 227 
orientation might be ameliorated by pre-operative interaction with virtual (44) and physical 228 
visual aids (45). However, such interventions are unlikely to work in isolation; healthcare 229 
delivery is a complex process involving the interactions of dynamical systems, and as such, 230 
interventions at the proximal level need to be considered in the context of the system in 231 
which they are embedded (46).  232 
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Table 1:  Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework Structu1 
Factor Description 
Active Failures 
Includes cognitive limitations- which encompass a broad spectrum of human performance related behaviours from lapses 
in judgement to sensorimotor errors. Examples include cutting corners that violate safe operating practices through to 
more implicit memory related factors.  
Situational 
Factors 
Covers multidisciplinary team (where issues may arise from professionals from different specialties working together, 
individual (the person delivering the care may have contributed to the failure e.g. through inexperience, attitude or stress 
induced by workload pressure), patient (clinical characteristics that increase probability of error e.g. dysphasic or suffering 
from cognitive difficulties) and task related factors (such as the novelty and risk of the procedure). 
Local Working 
Conditions 
Relates to local working conditions that can contribute to adverse events- such equipment and supplies (the availability 
and functionality of equipment), the lines of responsibility (and clarity around individual responsibility), supervision and 
leadership, management of staff (absence of skilled support) and staffing levels along with staff workload (e.g. ratio of 
staff relative to patient volume) and the physical environment (such as room layout, noise, lighting and temperature).  
Latent 
Organisational 
Factors 
Describes latent organisational factors- such as policy and procedures (e.g. poor quality or no standard operating 
procedures for equipment), bed scheduling factors – which result in treatment delays, the amount of support available 
from central services including clinical (availability of pharmacy or radiology support) through to non-clinical factors such 
as information technology and human. This class also includes training and education factors and the availability and 
appropriateness of induction training, and continuing professional development programmes.  
Latent External 
Factors 
Groups two latent external factors- the design of equipment and supplies (e.g. the design of the equipment impaired 
performance) and the external policy context- nationally driven directives that impact on the level and quality of resources 
available to hospitals with NICE guidelines and the European Working Time Directive as examples.  
Overarching 
Factors 
Incorporates communication systems (the effectiveness of the processes and systems in place for the exchange and 
sharing of information between staff, groups, departments and services) and safety culture issues (beliefs and practices 
surrounding the management of safety and learning from error) and is mapped across all five classes. 
